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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 721



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

'JEUNE AFRIQUE' READERS CONDEMN UNION BETWEEN CHAD, LIBYA

Paris, JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Apr 81 pp 76-77

[Article by Hamza Kaidi: "Results of Poll: No to Annexation"]

[Text] An overwhelming majority (81 percent) of our readers has denounced the union between Chad and Libya. This is the first fact that one could establish from the poll organized by JEUNE AFRIQUE (1096) following the announcement of the two countries' project to merge.

It must be made quite clear that this poll has no scientific intent nor does it claim to represent the entire African opinion, even though the majority of answers come from African countries. On the other hand, it clearly shows JEUNE AFRIQUE readers' thinking on the subject, for numerous Africans living abroad, as well as non-Africans, have answered.

However, let us return to the first question. Disapproval varies: stronger than average among Africans living on the continent (84.5 percent) and among non-Africans (84 percent). On the other hand, fewer Africans living abroad (65 percent) denounced the union. Surprisingly enough, the strongest reactions are noted among the minority which approves the union. As a matter of fact, many have considered it wise to accompany their answers with frequently heated comments: "Yes, union is strength," or "It's the best way to thwart imperialistic designs" etc.

Percentages for the second question are the same. For 80 percent of those "polled"—and, among them, for 86 percent of non-Africans—it is not a question of a union but rather an out-and-out annexation.

Does Goukouni have the right to effect this union (third question)? No, answered 86 percent of our readers. Once again, it is particularly the non-Africans who refuse to acknowledge him this right (86.5 percent), whereas Africans living abroad are more inclined to give it to him (67 percent say no). From both sides there was a good number of spontaneous comments. A condition frequently accompanies the reply: to consult the Chadian people. Concern for democracy? A good sign.

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Will this union be long-lasting (fourth question)? No, 80.5 percent of our readers believe. Africans living in Africa (84 percent say no) are more dubious than non-Africans (71 percent) and than Africans living abroad (69 percent).

Is Chad running the risk of splintering (fifth question)? "Pessimism" is slightly lower: 78 percent admit that this is possible, 22 percent reject the idea. It is the non-Africans and Africans living in Africa who most frequently predict the country's splintering (86 percent).

Qadhdhafi's politics worry 64 percent of the people questioned (sixth question). Non-Africans, in particular, are afraid of it (81 percent). African nationals living on the continent or abroad (65 percent and 53 percent respectively) are less fearful.

To whose best interests is the Libyan leader catering (seventh question)? Only 13 percent believe he is acting in the best interests of the Arabs, 18 percent for Islam, 40.5 percent for Libya and 68.5 percent for the best interests of the USSR. Some nevertheless maintain that above all else Qadhdhafi's main concerns is his own prestige.

Should France protect the integrity of the African States (eighth question)? Only 54 percent of our readers are in favor of the idea of French intervention. Here, Africans differ from non-Africans (67 percent say yes): 54 percent of Africans living in Africa are in favor of intervention, and the majority of those living abroad reject it (56 percent).

The ninth question completes the preceding ones: only 14 percent believe that loyalty to past ties is the determining factor in French policy, 22 percent believe it is concern for protecting Western strategic interests, and 64 percent that it is economic interests which first and foremost decide it.

1. Are you for or against the union between the two countries?:
for 19 percent
against 81 percent
2. In your opinion is it a question of a union?:
a union 20 percent
an annexation 80 percent
3. Has Goukouni the right to effect this union?:
yes 14 percent
no 86 percent
4. Do you think the union will be long lasting?:
yes 19.5 percent
no 80.5 percent
5. Is Chad running the risk of splintering?:
yes 78 percent
no 22 percent

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6. Are you afraid of Qadhdhafi's politics?:
yes 64 percent
no 36 percent
7. Do you think that Qadhdhafi is acting in the Arabs' best interests?:
yes 13 percent
no 87 percent
- in Islam's best interests?:
yes 18 percent
no 82 percent
- in Libya's best interests?:
yes 40.5 percent
no 59.5 percent
- in the USSR's best interests?:
yes 68.5 percent
no 31.5 percent
8. Should France protect the integrity of the Arab States?:
yes 54 percent
no 46 percent
- In your opinion, is the French policy regarding the African States based on?:
loyalty to past ties 14 percent
Western strategic interests 22 percent
French economic interests 64 percent

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SITUATION OF CHADIAN, OTHER REFUGEES IN KOUSSERI, CAMEROON

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Apr 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Carlos Moore, special correspondent, "One Day Like Another at Kousseri"]

[Text] 100,000 of them must have fled the Chadian civil war.
Now they "go home." But only for a few hours.

The hot, dry air burns our nostrils. No sign of life in this unbelievably denuded savannah, save for some monkeys we see in the distance from time to time. Or these tiny villages of some then inhabitants we pass through every 60 kilometers. Phantom villages? One might think so, were it not for the hands waving at us as we go by. Depressing and desolate, this North Cameroon in the dry season (February-May) and in this year of drought.

"Here we are!" the driver announced triumphantly after 4 hours over a dusty and jolting road, having brought us in a Land Rover from the office of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees, from Maroua (central Cameroon). So this is Kousseri!

We make our entrance slowly, along rows of houses made of thatch (only the "bourgeois" section is solid construction). As late as March 1980 the town had no more than 12,000 inhabitants. Since then the population has risen to 115,000. Our car passed over fine, dusty sand. "When the rains fall in May and June, all this will become a vast morass," I was told by Pierre von Gunten, a 36 year-old Swiss in charge of the HCR [High Commissioner, Refugees] program at Kousseri. We were momentarily swept by violent blasts of hot air and blinding swirls of dust raised by the harmattan, the wind that blows from the Chadian desert.

On Board Dugout Canoes

Now we were just opposite Ndjamen. One could clearly see the mosque, the cathedral, the houses in ruins. The capital of Chad is only 200 meters away, on the other side of the confluence of the Logone and the Chari. And where are the refugees? "We are going there!" I expected to find people with sinister looks. With a burst of laughter hundreds of children with lively shining eyes greeted us. They gathered around us as soon as we got out of our car and held their little hands out to us. The adults were no less cordial. They spoke easily. "In March of last year when the fighting began we fled by the thousands on board dugout canoes," said Abbeya Abdeljelid, 36, formerly a meteorologist for the ASECNA [Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar] station in Ndjamen. Many already had parents and relatives on the other side of Logone-Chari. The less fortunate had to sleep out in the open.

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"The Cameroonian authorities were compelled to dig wells on a crash basis to provide the refugees with drinking water right in the dry season, build shelters, bring up food supplies and medicine," von Gunten explained. Soon overwhelmed beyond their capabilities, they turned to HCR. Rescue operations began in April 1980 with a shipment of 1,175 tents and 170 tons of foodstuffs. "Between April and December 1980 HCR spent \$6.5 million on Chadian refugee relief," said Damaso Feci, a 42 year-old Italian HCR delegate to Cameroon. And what about 1981? "More than twice as much," he said. That must be so, as the programs are budgeted for \$13.15 million. From their end, the Cameroonian authorities submitted to the international benefactors a budget of \$64 million for eleven projects concerning non-Chadian refugees (Cameroon also has 15,000 refugees from Equatorial Guinea, 18,000 from the Central African Republic and 70 Namibians).

What is being done with this money at Kousseri? Von Gunten gave figures: HCR is building a primary school for 4000 pupils (with 40 Cameroonian teachers paid by their Ministry of Education and 20 Chadians paid by HCR); the wooden barracks where most of the refugees live; the storage facility (with 2,500 tons of foodstuffs); the rural hospitals staffed by doctors from every nationality (paid by HCR). Von Gunten recalled, "Last year a single epidemic of measles took the lives of 3,000 children."

The camp consists of long wooden barracks with corrugated sheetiron roofing alongside straw thatch huts or tents. Camp management is handled by the refugees themselves. They elect spokesmen, and a detachment of the Cameroonian Army is stationed nearby in Bivouac. What is the security situation? Von Gunten explained, "The Chadian refugees are a bit special insofar as they are all city people. It's the entire city of Ndjamen, with its workers and its burghers, but also with its criminals, its prostitutes, its thieves, who have all moved out."

High Crime Incidence

The spokesmen admit to a fairly high level of criminal activity. "Robberies are frequent, and we also have crimes," so Donorabaye Doungous Moro, president of the Ndjamen Court of Appeal, confessed to me. He now serves as secretary in the HCR office of Kousseri.

There are also political crimes. Such as the murder of the Kissein Habre partisan, killed in January and thrown in the river. "The people regroup themselves spontaneously according to tribal affinities and political tendencies," 34 year-old Cheflengar Ngar explained to me. He is a civil servant now acting as group Chief in the camp. "Except for brawls now and then we are coexisting peacefully. But everyone knows who is on whose side."

Trade and Racketeering

Others, on the contrary, have had to forget who they once were: the camp swarms with "has beens," people who begin by saying "I used to be..." Now there is no longer anything to differentiate them from the rest. Antoine Ahanda, journalist at CAMEROON TRIBUNE, says the following: "They had known honors, many lived in

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fine villas in Ndjamen. The war altered the aspects of their lives. A former ambassador is a woodcutter. Each morning he goes out of Kousseri with his wife and cuts wood, then he comes back and sells it in town. Former general managers of companies have become drawers (of water). High ranking officers spend the day catching fish to sell at nightfall."

In the camp the refugees are not all Chadians. Alphonse Bambo, for example, is Central African. He used to work at the Italian Embassy at Ndjamen "when things began to heat up between the Hissein and Goukouni forces. There are also lots of Togolese, Milains, Beninese and Senegalese," he told me. "But we are all in the same boat. People like myself have no money to go back home."

The Chadians "go home" every day. Rather, they pretend to go home. Each morning the Cameroonian bank of the Logone is black with people. There is pushing and shoving to get aboard dozens of dugout canoes that come and go between the two banks. "They leave in the morning to see their family, what used to be their house often in ruins, and also to do some business because there is nothing available in Ndjamen," I was told by Ahmed Dambi, a young Sara of 22, follower of Kamougue. Do they sell food they get from HCR? "Oh! That is possible. But I cannot say so positively."

In any event, the life of refugees in Kousseri is not free of racketeering. Over half the business people are Chadians, and it seems that they do not give out anything for free! Prices of foodstuffs of basic necessity are constantly rising: in three months a 100 kilogram bag of rice has gone up from 12,000 to 17,000 CFA francs. But the refugees accuse the Cameroonian retailers mostly, and even certain officials. There are about two hundred people there to tell all these tales of woe. "You may mention our names if you wish. We are not lying. We want [the President] Ahidjo to know what's going on here," one of them exclaimed. Another picks up the line, noisily applauded by the gathering: "For at least six months we had to pay for all our food in cash. The situation has changed, but abuses continue." They add that protests have been made.

How long?

Dusk descends on the Logone. Far away, the plaintive voice of a muezzin. Dozens of dugout canoes slide over the water. The refugees are returning from Ndjamen which they had to leave before curfew. A really startling scene, these men and women "returning" to the camp full of noisy gaiety after spending a day "at home." Are they still refugees? How much longer will the Cameroonian authorities tolerate these comings and goings? "We don't want to force them to go back, but neither is it our intention to settle them in Cameroon," says Mr Bello Bouba, deputy secretary general at the presidency. "Our only wish is that they should get back to their homes peacefully."

Some Cameroonians are frankly hostile. Generally, however, the HCR representatives told me that the Cameroonians have been very welcoming and understanding. The feeling of the man in the street is close to what was said by a Kousseri man of some family standing: "After all, they are our brothers."

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

NIGERIA PROMISE TO UGANDA--On 7 April, the Nigerian chief of state, Alhaji Shehu Shagari received the Ugandan minister of economic planning and development and promised that his country would participate in Uganda's reconstruction effort. The president said that Nigeria understood the current Ugandan situation perfectly "because it had experienced similar problems itself." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1194] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

POST-ELECTION PROBLEMS FACING PRESIDENT DACKO NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Apr 81 p 33

[Article by Francois Soudan, "Tough Post-Election Problems"]

[Text] A few hours after proclamation by the Supreme Court of the results of the presidential election, Thursday 19 March, the command post of the French paratroops in Operation "Barracuda" at Bangui was besieged by anguished phone calls: "They're going to massacre us, like at Kolwezi," a cooperation worker is said to have screamed not far from the Mesquine section where the first disturbances had just taken place. At Bossangoa in the northwest helicopters and Transalls from Operation Barracuda were needed Saturday 21 March to evacuate 70 terrorized French nationals from that small prefecture.

State of Siege

The wind of panic that swept through the white community of the Central African Republic (3,500 French civilians) is perhaps the most tangible sign of the true stakes of these elections: for or against Barracuda; for or against the presence of the 1500 paratroopers at Bouar and Bangui. By making this point the chief thrust of his campaign, candidate Ange Patasse won the support of the radicalized youth of Bangui, the politically aware middle classes and the "godobes"--the unemployed of Kilometre cinq and Mesquine. In short, all those who were the spearhead of the anti-Bokassa dispute in January and April 1979 and feel cheated of victory by a coup arranged in Paris and a president--David Dacko--who came to power "by parachute."

Opportunistic Leader

To be sure no one is unaware that the frauds, pressures, manipulations that sent along with the 15 March balloting were "shared" between the two principal camps and that they stayed, if one may say, within the limits of the tolerable. Besides, the young agitators were very careful not to be too active in the defense of Ange Patasse: this opportunistic leader who served Bokassa for twelve years does not enjoy their full confidence. His repeated appeals for calm--jointly voiced with the other defeated candidates, Francois Pehoua (5.3 percent of the votes), Henri Maidou (3.2 percent) and Abel Goumba (1.4 percent)--brought very little response.

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Welcomed with a certain amount of enthusiasm at the time of the emperor's downfall in September 1979, the Barracuda force is now the target of lively criticism. There are those who even wonder if the recent reinforcements were not due to a concern for controlling the country's internal situation, because of the outlook for a post-election situation Paris was predicting might be "delicate." The impression was confirmed by the fact that the French paratroopers were assigned to guard the Bangui airport threatened by the agitators. The Central African Army, even though headed by one of Dacko's "faithful," General Sana, was not evidently considered wholly reliable.

By basing himself on the one hand upon a legitimacy, disputed but nonetheless acquired, on the peasant world which spoke out massively in his favor, and on the other upon the French contingent, David Dacko made his choice for firmness, compelling his opponents to choose between submission and a civil war which would turn the Central African Republic into another Chad. A dangerous bet that could be won on three conditions: continuation of the experiment of a multi-party system, wider opening of the future government to the followers of Ange Patasse, renegotiation of the functions and deployment of the Baracuda troops, as the opposition unanimously demands. And it is certainly not the dissolution, demanded by certain individuals close to Dacko, of Ange Patasse's MLPC [Central African People's Liberation Movement] that would make it easier to win this bet. Quite the contrary.

Living Conditions

A final point of capital importance remains to be straightened out: that of the daily life of the two and a half million Central Africans. After all, the fundamental reason for the initial disturbances that shook the new republic is doubtless connected with the fact that for many the standard of living has not improved since Bokassa's downfall. The demonstrations of 20 March were also demonstrations of hunger.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SURVIVAL OF DACKO GOVERNMENT DESCRIBED AS UNCERTAIN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 pp 981-983

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere "The Ordeal of Recovery"]

[Text] In contrast with the disturbances of 19 and 20 March, calm has returned to Bangui and to the main towns in the provinces, though one still cannot be sure that from now on all threat of an explosion has been warded off. What is more to be feared is that Mr Dacko may be tempted, if the factional fighting should resume, to brandish the threat of a new intervention by the 1,400 French soldiers who are deployed between the capital and Bouar, in order to restore order. This would be an intervention the French would certainly like to avoid, except for the protection needed for our nationals and their possessions, as they did in Bossangoa. But there is a realization that such actions could easily get out of control. On the other hand, no one discounts the possibility that Mr Dacko's enemies, banking on the unlikelihood that French troops would go into action while France is in the midst of presidential elections, could try to take advantage of this to settle their accounts with him.

Fortunately, it is not certain that the candidates defeated on 15 March are consciously intending to stir things up again, the violence of the most recent outbreak having a fact visibly surprised them. Its origin is not secret, since it started in the high schools and the Bangui University center, but the deeper motives are not at all clear. The party leaders and candidates who could be reached for questioning all acknowledged, in any case, that the French contingent had been neutral. This is no faint praise in a capital where it has been the tradition for the last 20 years to pin on France the responsibility for political convulsions, the media having in turn accused General De Gaulle of having "made" Bokassa and Mr Giscard d'Estaing of having kept him in power, without considering the fact that the economic development goals of French assistance serve more to stabilize regimes than to overthrow them. Thus one sees the budget balancing subsidies and special Treasury advances which have been and unhappily remain to this day a constant feature in the Central African Republic.

Indeed, one could more justly reproach the French Government--at least from a political, if not moral, point of view--for having contributed to the removal of Bokassa in 1979, if it had not been encouraged to do so by the African states at Kigali, and if the people in France who accused it of interventionism in the aftermath of September 1979 were not the same ones who were reproaching it several months previously for not yet having intervened.

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Similar causes produce similar effects: Mr Dacko has since been described as timorous and muddle-headed for having opted for a multi-party system instead of a single party. Today he is denounced for electoral fraud because he was only elected by a 50.23 percent majority of the votes cast, over his most significant rival, Mr Ange Patasse, whose main claims to fame in the presidential race were to have served successively under Bokassa as a minister, prime minister, and master of ceremonies at the coronation, and to have benefited from the generosity of Col Qadhdhafi once Bokassa was gone. In the "Hexagon's" assessment of the political phenomena, the most aggravating aspect is not so much that they make our Africa strategy incoherent, but that by a boomerange effect they often influence the facts themselves. The Bangui University Center, where the uprising started, is also the only place in the Central African Republic where local events are judged on the basis of Parisian newspapers and magazines. Mr Dacko may have opted for a multi-party system out of instinctive liberalism, or because he believed the multiplicity of candidates would work to his advantage. But it was also out of concern to show himself in Paris as the defender of a democratic system who had won his success in the last known free elections held in the Central African Republic, in 1964, and out of a desire, as a leftist and the spiritual heir of Boganda, to disarm the hostility of the French opposition, which he believes to come from a lamentable misunderstanding.

So there exist several possible interpretations of the events in Bangui. One of them, characteristically French in style, focuses on the merits, affinities and rivalries between and among Mr Abel Guende Goumba's Patriotic Front, Mr Ange Patasse's Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People, and Mr Henri Maidou's Republican Party for Progress, not to mention Mr Dacko's own Central African Democratic Union or the Socialist Party and Mr Francois Gueret's Movement for Democracy and Independence, which have not fielded candidates in the elections. But to the beat of the jungle drums one might conceive a different interpretation, related to ethnic or emotional drives difficult to control, which seemed sufficiently disturbing to the former opponents on 15 March to cause them, regardless of any initial participation in the unleashing of the disturbances, to find a new reconciliation.*

The Financial Crisis

Of all France's former African territories, the Central African Republic is doubtless the one which has least successfully withstood the challenges of independence. The task was not made easier, it is true, by the brutal disappearance, even before his proclamation [sic], of the only leader of real scope, who had gathered around him an elite group as unusual as it was deeply divided.

For 20 years, agriculture, which supports 80 percent of the active population, has seen a decline in both commodity production and in exports, a slow but progressive decline that can only be explained by factors beyond the activity of the growers themselves, such as the imposition of poorly adapted and costly institutional structures on the farmers, or the fraudulent confiscation of stabilization fund

*See below, under separate heading on p 1015, for the composition of the new government headed by Mr Bozanga.

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reserves by people at the highest levels. The Central African peasants must have hoped that Bokassa's departure would put an end to the inevitable decline in the standard of living that resulted. But it has not done so. It is not that one sees a resurgence of waste and prevarication among the political players. Rather, Dacko's government has given priority to the re-establishment of a subtle political equilibrium focused on the urban sector while postponing the unpopular sacrifices that are needed to put the state's finances back in order and without which the economy cannot be restored. But in spite of this the urban sector has not been appeased. It even ended up, as things turned out, in the role of detonator. Behind it there simmers the popular discontent that has been accumulating 20 years and that could, at the least spark, endanger the fragile institutional framework Mr Dacko has embraced.

At the heart of the financial problems is the problem of the civil service. This problem should have been attacked even before the re-establishment of the parties, which seized control over it [the civil service] in order to block any action. There were 6,000 employees in 1964. Today there are 26,000, of whom 20,000 live in Bangui. Their wages take up 85 percent of the state's revenues, or rather they would do so unless a substantial portion of the budget were funded by France, apart from other financial aid provided under the rubrics of military aid (3.2 billion Fr CFA in 1980), auditing of internal debt (5 billion), material administrative assistance and, of course, 447 aid personnel, including 226 teachers and 35 doctors, which France maintains in the Central African Republic.

The Elements of an Economic Recovery

Several months after his return to power, Mr Dacko stated that agricultural production had gone down 14 percent in 14 years, while diamond production had dropped 47 percent in the same period.

The vagaries of diamond production are linked to modifications in the production system introduced by Bokassa in one of his whims, and to the hardly shining role played in the affair by certain Israeli nationals. The most recent of them, General Samuel Gonen, who was by turns manager of ILEGON, SICAMIN Diamond Mining Co., and SOROMINE, is presently under house arrest for tax irregularities, the debts left by the three companies amounting to 650 million Fr CFA, a large part of which is in the form of wages. The production itself is not in jeopardy. Though it is charged that production has dropped nearly 50 percent by weight since 1974, a decline that has been more than compensated for by the rise in the diamond market since that time, there is no technical reason why the 1974 level (400,000 carats) could not once again be reached, by reorganizing extraction and above all marketing.

In relation to agriculture, there is room to quibble with the statements supplied by Mr Dacko. Doubtless the decline in cottonseed production--which went from 58,000 tons in 1970 to 37,000 tons in 1980--has been correctly recorded. But this is not the first time for a crisis of this type in the Central African Republic, and one must go all the way back to before independence, to the administration of Barthélemy Boganda, to see the first signs of it, coinciding with the suppression of the companies that monopolized cotton milling. Certainly there was good reason to modify their status, but nothing since that time has

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replaced them, despite the all too brief technical support contributed at one period by the French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers (CFDT). By comparison with 1974, on the other hand, coffee production has increased by nearly 13 percent. Tobacco, too. The tonnage of rough and sawed lumber has dropped 30 percent since 1974.

So on balance the scorecard is generally disappointing, though not catastrophic; moreover, one should analyze with caution, because of the uncertainty of the statistical data since 1966. But this scorecard was not caused by the failure of the farmers to work, but rather by increasing problems in getting produce to market, the result of the deterioration of river and road transport and increases in the cost of energy, the impact of all this on the profits of the producers, who were also victimized by purchasing producers that verged on the dishonest, and finally the lack of regular provisions of fertilizers, pesticides, and spare parts, not to mention the increasing scarcity in the markets in the interior of imported commodities the acquisition of which motivates the peasant to work more than just enough for bare subsistence.

A Évolution des principales productions d'exportation de la République centrafricaine					
	B Coton graine (tonnes)	C Café (tonnes)	D Tabac (tonnes)	F Bois (grumes et sciages) (tonnes)	F Diamants (carats)
1963	24 000	—	—	—	—
1970	58 000	—	—	—	—
1974	48 000	10 000	1 370	710 000	400 000
1975	47 500	9 700	1 874	225 000	338 000
1976	33 500	12 300	1 875	—	286 000
1977	41 043	9 900	2 440	—	297 000
1978	30 000	10 200	2 750	400 000	284 000
1979	32 150	13 200	2 000	330 000	—
1980	37 000	13 600	—	—	—

A. Changes in Central African Republic's Production of Principal Exports

- B. Cottonseed (tons)
- C. Coffee (tons)
- D. Tobacco (tons)
- E. Lumber (rough and sawed) (tons)
- F. Diamonds (carats)

In preparing this white paper, somewhat overly dramatized in quantitative terms, on Bokassa's administration, Mr Dacko was doubtless betting on a fairly rapid recovery for which he would have received the political credit, soon to be consolidated by the democratic reform of institutions. The bi-annual plan approved on 21 March 1980 calculated the resources needed for recovery: 45 billion Fr CFA, including 14.4 for agriculture and stock raising, 14.3 for river, road, and aviation infrastructures, 4.2 for telecommunications and radio broadcasting, 2.7 for urbanization, 2.7 for industry, energy, and mines, 6.7 for the

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social sector (health and education), and 0.27 for administration. It was a reasonable projection, eliminating or revising investments in sectors of uncertain profitability. Thus, uranium got only a 1.2 billion appropriation for the building--in France--of an experimental plant to process the ore from Kabouma.

The meeting of the donors, both traditional and possible--FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund], EDF [European Development Fund], the World Bank, the UNDP, the African Economic Commission, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation [CCCE], West Germany, etc., held in Bangui in June 1980 brought some positive results which we will further on we will examine in detail. In truth, some of the assistance obtained is of a routine nature and primarily results from obscure considerations of quotas that determine, most of the time, the distribution of international aid. Presented last February as the "sine qua non for the Central African Republic's external creditors to grant a moratorium to lighten the public debt," this program brought forth by Prime Minister J.-P. Le Boudier has been given new life with the announcement that the IMF would participate at the level of 4.4 billion Fr CFA. This is an endowment that could go as high as 20 billion as part of a 4-year, 90-billion program, the broad lines of which Mr Bedaya N'Garou, the minister of foreign affairs, has recently been asked to explain in Paris, Geneva, Brussels and New York.

This initiative calls for a preliminary observation, with respect to the priority given to fulfillment of the plan in order to obtain a moratorium from the state's creditors. In reality, from their point of view and from that of investors generally, the implementation of the program itself is less important than the preliminary effects of a financial housecleaning, in particular the implantation of a system of financial monitoring that makes it possible to verify the facts at any moment. The IMF, one of the financial pillars on which the program rests, can only be of the same view, and Mr Le Boudier himself has explicitly acknowledged this in his statement. It will be interesting to get the reaction of the creditors at the meeting that should be taking place at the end of April in the Club of Paris framework.

Participation in the Recovery Program

The assistance gained to date, whether made concrete by specific agreement or simply existing as an agreement in principle, can be subjected to sectoral estimates and, in due course, more general appraisals.

Concerning rural development and stock raising, a cotton and food production operation undertaken by SOCADA [expansion unknown], in which the French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers [CFDT] is a 25 percent shareholder along with the Central African Republic, can be assured of subscriptions of about 1.9 billion Fr CFA coming from FAC subsidies, and long-term loans with comfortable grace periods and concessional interest rates from the Central Fund [CCCE]. They represent the first installment of a program that is supposed to be expanded over a 5-year period and reach 30 billion. There is also a 470 million Fr CFA credit line opened by West Germany for a stockraising project.

In the field of road infrastructure, the contributions to which FAC agreed are 450 million Fr CFA for the Berberati-Carnot-Baoro highway and 29 million for the study of the trans-African artery from Lagos to Mombasa. The FRG will provide 705

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million to assist in road repair and restoration work on the highway linking Bossembele to Baboua (on the Cameroon border). Two reloading units on the Bambari-Bangassou route have been provided by Japan. The participation envisaged by the International Development Association (IDA), the African Development Bank (ABD) and the Kuwaiti Fund in the asphaltting of the Bangui-Bossembele road (146 kilometers), and the participation envisaged by the FAC and the EFD in the restoration of the Central African segment of the Bossembele-Garoua route (440 km) are not yet known.

Improvement of river transport by the ACCF [Central African Agency for River Communications] was the subject of a 1 billion loan from the CCCE and a 330 million subsidy from the FAC. 25 million was also granted by the FAC for a study on modernization of Bangui-Mpoko airport.

In the social sector, we note the opening of a 1 billion Fr CFA line of credit with the Republic of Iraq for the construction of schools and hospitals. Subsidies totalling 136 million, in the form of educational and pedagogical materials, have been provided by the FAC for administration and higher education. In the field of forests and preserves, 250 million in FAC credits will be made available for the improvement of the reserves and parks.

A Les échanges commerciaux de la France et de la RCA			
(En millions de francs français)			
		1979	1980
Importations françaises en provenance de RCA	B	151	173
Exportations françaises vers la RCA	C	189	240.6
Taux de couverture pour la France		125.12 %	139.3 %

- A. Trade Between France and the Central African Republic
- B. French Imports from the CAR
- C. French Exports to the CAR
- D. Rate of Coverage for France

In all, about 8.5 billion Fr CFA in external public aid has now been assured by agreements already signed or moving toward signing, assistance that can be used in the next 2 years. If one counts the annual amounts provided by FAC and EFD, each of which could amount to approximately 3.6 billion; by the USAID's \$15 million program which has not yet gone into effect but should be under way in the course of the next 4 years, and finally by the financial assistance of the IMF, one comes to a total of 19 billion Fr CFA.

It is much more difficult to estimate the overall total of private investment that could arrive in the same period, and the annual pace of its disbursement. Begun in 1980, the Citroen assembly plant is estimated at 525 million Fr CFA. SOMDIAA's return to participation in SICPAD (Central African Industrial Company for Food

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Products and Derivatives) should result in an 80 million increase in capital. The expansion of MOCAF (Motte-Cordonnier Afrique) and the Central Brewery Co. installations might be evaluated at around 1.1 billion, with the probability of some additional amounts over the next three fiscal years. ICAT (Central African Textile Industry), after paying off the indemnities for nationalization owing to the Willot Brothers, should be re-established financially with an 800 million Fr CFA loan from the Development Bank of the Central African States [BDEAC], which will top off the private participation. The building of a cement factory and a tannery--feasibility studies which are likely to be assigned to Schaeffer Establishments, is being considered, though no firm decision has yet been made.

Even in the optimal scenario where all this assistance comes through within the time-frame of the bi-annual program, it will be observed that it represents only 50 percent of a total presented as the bare minimum needed for restoration of the apparatus of production and evacuation [sic]. It is not insignificant, but it is inadequate. The 4-year program itself depends on the pace of progress in the first 2 years, and moreover it was with this fact in mind that the amounts of the FAC subsidies and CCCE loans were calculated in broad terms. The idea is to start a movement to be followed by all the international organizations and western or Arab bilateral assistance programs. Some very ambitious projects, especially those concerning palm-oil and continued work on the large telecommunications program, therefore remain in abeyance while awaiting the first indications of the hoped-for momentum.

The "Second Circle"

An acquaintance with these elements is useful in assessing Mr Dacko's record as chief of state and the effectiveness of Mr Le Boudier's government team. Without even going into the present world situation, which slows down the general endeavor of cooperation with the least advantaged countries at a time when their needs will probably be increased, it is unfortunately quite conceivable that the delays observed in cleaning up the public finances are not going to contribute to disbursement of the anticipated aid on schedule, and that the March uprising, by bringing into question the stability of the government, may further reinforce donor reluctance.

Mr Dacko and his team in Bangui find themselves locked in a "first circle" of anxious and discontented functionaries and hostile politicians who constitute a permanent threat to them. Because they failed to extricate themselves in time, their only hope now for breaking out of it is the application of force. But the peasant unrest they thereby risk igniting could lock them within a "second circle" still more dangerous to break asunder than the first. It is not certain, either, that the control mechanisms that have made it possible to rehabilitate the financial situation in Gabon since 1978 would be applicable to the Central African Republic, even if they were accepted, as they could only be implemented by a government that is politically sure of itself. By virtue of its natural wealth, Gabon could also count on the understanding of creditors and investors to a degree that the Central African Republic cannot. Mr Dacko certainly deserves the esteem of the international community for his obstinacy in re-establishing within his country the conditions for a democratic dialogue. But the survival of his government rests today less on such a dialogue than on a mix of force--in order not to be forced to use it--and political action. It is to be hoped that others do not consider themselves better qualified than he to practice it.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT SEEKS FRENCH PUBLICITY AID -- The Central African Government, anxious to improve its image before the presidential elections of 15 March, turned to a French firm specializing in political marketing and publicity. The firm's officers, men close to the Gaullist candidate Jacques Chirac, refused the account. The Bangui authorities then turned to another agency that belongs to a well-known French journalist, this time successfully. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Apr 81 p 40] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1981] 2750

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ETHIOPLA

ITALY SEEN AS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN NATIONAL RECOVERY

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 19 Apr 81 p 3

[Article by Mino Vignolo: 'Ethiopia Can Become 'Nonaligned''']

[Excerpts] Addis Ababa--"Pen, mister," ask the children who follow the visitor from abroad along the muddy side streets of the Addis Ababa market. The usual scene, but a new request: they are asking for a pen before asking for money. A revolution means also that it give its children a taste for learning, and the government that launched the literacy campaign in such grand style can be genuinely proud.

Nine Ethiopians out of 10 still live in rural areas; in truth, the great majority only survive more than live. Land has been assigned to peasants' associations and cooperatives. The network of the approximately 25,000 associations covers almost the entire country. The success of the Ethiopian revolution will be measured by the degree of their own achievements. However, an objective judgment will have to wait for years and perhaps decades.

Results have not been encouraging so far and productivity is more or less the same as during the imperial era; however, the quality of life has improved and peasants now at least eat what they produce. I visited the Kuriftu cooperative, in the fertile Awash River valley, about 50 km south of Addis Ababa. The moment the city is left behind, one goes back several centuries and finds oneself in an archaic, immobile society. The sky may be traversed by MiG's, but on the land, the life of the peasants is the same as thousands of years ago. This is a small 51-acre cooperative with 78 families. The land belongs to the state and is entrusted to the cooperative in perpetuity. Production consists mainly of tomatoes, onions, potatoes and cabbage. Self-sufficiency has been attained for food, and later, surplus will be sold to the state. The peasants joined the cooperative of their own free will; they had owned no land and had everything to gain. Others, more individualistic, prefer to cultivate 1 acre on their own. A woman called Derardu is the cooperative's president. Of course, she states that things are much better now, while an official in charge of political training is observing her closely.

Just in front of the mud and straw hut that is the cooperative's headquarters stands the only tractor. It is Italian and used to belong to a landowner. Teodoros, an expert from the Ministry of Agriculture, tells me in halting Italian:

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"Italian tractor good--Russian tractors no good." Teodoros is teaching two peasants selected from among the brightest how to use the tractor. It is a panorama of hard work and poverty, but also of serenity. Food and shelter are insured, and no one is dying of hunger any longer here, in the Awash River valley. One of the results of the revolution is that poor people live better in the villages than in the cities.

It is difficult not to notice the foreign comrades. They are always in a group and never talk to anyone. The comrades who came from the Soviet Union to save the Ethiopian revolution stayed on after their mission was accomplished. In order to restrict to a minimum their contacts with the "natives," they even prefer to import their servants from the homeland. But he who sows mistrust also reaps mistrust, and something more. One must admit that the Ethiopian population does not like the Russians and considers them arrogant and disdainful, not to say racist.

Perhaps the regime's leaders only feel a debt of gratitude toward them for having helped Ethiopia when it was threatened. There are approximately 2,500 Soviet advisers, who train officers as well as soldiers. They come from all levels of the military hierarchy and there are even some generals. Civilian cooperants (1,500) work in the field of technical assistance, especially in the backward mining sector.

The presence of other advisers from the Eastern bloc is subject to iron rules of specialization: East Germans (approximately 1,000) work in the fields of security, police, communications, newspapers. Bulgarians remain in the health sector and the less trusted Hungarians work in the civil construction sector. Obviously, the Soviets and East Germans are in a position to control, if not influence, key sectors of the country's life. However, the most numerous foreign contingent is still made up by the Cubans. Castro's men are the armed branch that made the 1978 Ogaden victory possible. Now that the Ethiopian army is well organized, well armed and somewhat disciplined, Cubans are no longer seriously needed. But Fidel wants them to remain for domestic and international political reasons. Thus one witnesses the strange recycling of military men working essentially at agricultural and road-building tasks. In contrast to the Russians, they are not averse to fraternizing with the local population, perhaps even too much so. They have been removed from Addis Ababa because they were creating a number of problems. Enjoying a solid and well-deserved reputation of poverty (they are only paid some tens of dollars a month), they had begun to harass the girls who were asking for more money. They were finally moved to the Gondar region and toward the eastern border with Somalia. They form today a small army in waiting.

How about the West? No one can forget it or pretend it does not exist. One must come to terms with the West, or, in other words, with capitalism. The USSR may provide military and political assistance, but substantial economic aid can only come from the capitalist world. This is one lesson that other African revolutionary regimes have learned at their own expense. There are perhaps ties among the economies of the states of international capitalism that cannot be cut off.

Opting for Marxism means that one becomes a prisoner of the international monetary system and of the international fluctuations of supply and demand. Ethiopia is

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well aware of this when it witnesses the fall of coffee prices, a product that represents more than three-fourths of total exports. Finally, Western technology is better. Thus Fiat trucks, tractors and buses are welcomed with open arms by the Ethiopians, while hundreds of Soviet tractors lie useless on the Debre Zeit road.

The demonization of Ethiopia within Western public opinion has had heavy economic consequences. The first result of this demonization--caused, let it be said in passing, more by the alignment of Mengistu's regime with the Soviet camp than by human rights violations--has been that Ethiopia, one of the poorest nations in the world, receives the lowest per capita assistance, less than one-fourth the average aid to other underdeveloped countries. The United States, all-powerful within international economic organizations, knows how to punish its enemies. Today, however, now that Ethiopia is exhibiting signs of overtures to the West, something is moving. The World Bank has unblocked credits that will partly finance agricultural development and the IMF is negotiating a loan. The Ethiopian Government's 10-year investment program estimates that 900 billion [as published] a year will be needed from foreign assistance sources. Last year such assistance amounted to 250 billion; Ethiopia cannot fight against underdevelopment without international aid. Natural and manmade calamities must be added to internal weaknesses and limited resources. Drought and the misery of war in some regions have worsened the fate of millions of human beings already condemned to subhuman conditions. The conscience of the international community, if it exists, is apparently slow to awaken. Ethiopia needs peace and help. And Italy can do a great deal. We Italians are less "foreign" than other foreigners in the eyes of the Ethiopians: we have human, historic and cultural ties that have been reinforced during many decades and which could be the premise for a degree of cooperation much higher than the present one. The road to genuine "non-alignment," Mengistu's stated goal, could possibly go through Italy.

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LIBERIA

CONFUSION, POWER STRUGGLES SEEN LIMITING REVOLUTION'S SUCCESS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Apr 81

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima "Revolution or Chaos?"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] A year after Samuel K. Doe's putsch, the scene is one of confusion. The government is paralyzed, and the armed forces are torn by factional struggles.

Up on the heights of Monrovia, overlooking the city and the /West Point/ of the Atlantic Ocean that stretches at its feet, the immense masonic temple has lost some of its splendor. As recently as a year ago, this superb edifice was the pride of the Liberian ruling class which used to meet there to discuss problems of the brotherhood, which had an iron grip on the country. This high meeting ground is nothing more now than the vestige of a past that is doubtless forever gone. Sacked, pillaged, it is a building in ruins, transformed into headquarters for boy scouts hardly recognizable as such by a foreigner surveying the hill that leads up to the Ducor International. Today something strange hangs in the air of this luxury hotel--30 percent of which is owned by the Lebanese--where in July 1979 hundreds of delegates to the seventh OAU summit meeting hustled and bustled.

Outside, a half-dozen "ladies of the night" are negotiating their admission to the bar. The doorman demands his /"entry fee"/ which varies from customer to customer. This money will never go into the coffers of the hotel management, which is supposed to be unaware of this practice. With a sigh filled with sadness, the receptionist admits that the telephone is /"tired"/ and that the two telex lines have been cut since....12 April 1980.

Corruption Continues

On that day, Samuel Kanyon Doe justified his military coup based on /"the rampant corruption and inability of the government to effectively manage the affairs of the Liberian people."/ One year later, things seem to have remained as they were, or even gotten worse in some fields. Workers and students freely parody the regime's slogans. Because speeches and official bulletins invariably end with the watchword: /In the cause of the people the struggle continues./ Secretaries, civil servants, and businessmen amend it to read: /In the cause of the people, the corruption continues./

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Improvised Navigation

One sees the same thing at work in the schools and at the university where one can read the words /The revolution encourages education/ proudly posted on the walls. The students themselves formulate it differently: /The revolution encourages corruption./

Has the group of 18 noncommissioned officers, who on the night of 11-12 April 1980 put an end to more than a century in which the 300 families who came from the United States alone wielded power, gone too far?

At the Executive Mansion, which houses the offices of the presidency, the statue of Jesus Christ welcoming visitors with open arms is still in place. On the fourth floor, where the office of the president is located, the walls still bear the marks of bullets. In most of the waiting rooms in the ministries, reviews published under the old regime still lie about. The black American /handshake/ is still in fashion. Is it possible the past is not dead? The truth is more simple.

The leadership in Monrovia is not in control of the situation. /"It's strictly flying by the seat of one's pants,"/ says an African diplomat. As for Mr Cyrus Dennis, the brother of the former minister of foreign affairs, Cecil Dennis, who was executed several days after the coup, he charges: /"The only program the present leaders have is the total elimination of the/ free men (descendents of the black slaves who came from America)." Words from an embittered man preparing to leave the country after having sold all his possessions. While it may be true that Pan Am's airplanes are full of passengers bound for the United States, where they are taking thousands of /free men,/ the present government is doing everything possible to prevent the excesses of a few small groups.

All the same, there have been two great waves of departures. The first, understandably, immediately after the coup. The second, which has been growing larger over the last 4 months, is more disquieting: it concerns many trained people who have taken advantage of a mission abroad to resign.

This is the case with Gerald Cooper, head of the Primary Maritime Program for the economy. It is also the case with Charles Green, former director of the Liberian National Bank--which incidentally just closed its doors--, with Ellen Johnson Surleaf, Tolbert's former minister of finances and head of the bank for development and industry. She has rejoined the World Bank, from which she had resigned to work for the government. Other notable departures include two former ministers under William Tolbert who had retained their functions under the current regime: Gabriel Tucker (Public Works) and Lunseni Dunzo (Activities for Development and Progress).

These defections have profoundly shaken the fragile edifice. Because they have not had the requisite education, the new leaders are inexperienced. This gives rise to that laxity and anarchy which is most perceptible at the highest levels, to the point of paralyzing the operations of the machinery. The Popular Redemption Council (PRC), composed exclusively of noncommissioned officers, intends to put the government, primarily made up of civilians, into the background. This duality of authority is matched by factional strife within each organ.

Libya, through the intervention of two men, brought about the conditions that resulted in bringing to light the conflict between the two supreme authorities. In December 1980, the government agreed to permit Libya to open a people's mission in Monrovia. Qadhdhafi had already provided significant subsidies. A joint commercial

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enterprise, the Liberian-Libyan Holding and Co., had even been created. Among its subsidiaries was to be a bank with Libyan capital. On Tubman Boulevard, on the doorstep of the Sinkor residential section, not far from the ministry of foreign affairs, Libya is building an imposing complex on a property which is to house the company's headquarters.

Between Monrovia and Tripoli, things seemed to be running as smooth as silk. But it was not to the liking of General Quiwonkpa, commanding general of the armed forces, who during a resounding press conference on 8 March declared himself opposed to the opening of a Libyan embassy. Bacchus Matthews, the diplomatic chief, replies: "/General Quiwonkpa is a soldier, and Liberian diplomacy is fashioned at the ministry of foreign affairs."/

Duality of Authority

General Quiwonkpa, 26, who has a close relationship with the head of state and is considered to be Liberia's /strong man,/ is the leading figure of the liberal faction in the PRC. Generally thought to be pro-American, he does not deny it and in fact asserts that "/it is only the United States that has come to the rescue of the Liberian people since the coup."/ Against him is the "hardline" faction represented by Generals Thomas Weh Syen and Nicholas Podier, who are respectively the vice president and the spokesman of the Popular Redemption Council.

So, who is in charge in Monrovia? When one hears the chief of the general staff on 8 March declare his intention to "/play a larger role in national affairs,"/ one is tempted to believe the army makes the laws. This is not so clear, however, as is proven by the vagaries that have accompanied the ministerial re-shuffle of 24 February, which took place during the absence of Bacchus Matthews, who had gone to Addis Ababa to represent Liberia at the OAU ministerial meeting. Sergeant-Major Doe thus rid himself of seven members of the government team, while Matthews found himself given a [new] deputy minister in the person of Sumo Jones, head of the security services under the old regime. Samuel Pearson, Tolbert's defense minister, was named ambassador at large.

Upon his return to Monrovia, Matthews did not disguise his hostility to the presidential initiative. He explained the reasons for his anger to a group of African diplomats.

1. The shake-up came less than a year after the formation of the government. Did the ministers have time to merely study the dossiers?
2. The sacking of three key ministers was not opportune given the economic and social conditions.
3. The principal political leaders who are a part of the government were not consulted. In particular, Matthews (Progressive People's Party, PPP), Nah Tipoteh and Henri Fanbulleh (MOJA, Movement for Justice in Africa), who the public believes to be the briars of the regime.

Lack of Authority

Sergeant Doe invoked the necessity of remodeling a government that was set up in precipitous haste right after the coup. The new make-up, however, reflects an obvious

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concern for ethnic balance. Nevertheless, Bacchus Matthews demanded that at least the two nominations affecting his department be annulled. He went on strike, left his residence at Guest House next to the ministry of foreign affairs, to entrench himself in the OAU village some 5 kilometers from the city. He did not have the time to resign, as he had expressed the intention to do. After 48 hours of rumor and suspense, he was given satisfaction. Sumo Jones was named to Information while Samuel Pearson became the commander of Robertsfield Airport.

This episode proves just how narrow is Sergeant Doe's room to maneuver. Moreover, everything happens as if power were slipping away from him. In fact, has he ever really exercised it? In the present system, the government's role consists precisely in studying the issues and transmitting the files to the PRC, who must make the political decision. Already PRC committees are established [to work] side by side with the ministries they control. The tragedy is that the soldiers who make up the council are ex-noncommissioned officers who are not at all prepared to assume such functions. In the name of the revolution, men of the ranks have been named high officers. For example, one soldier who has become a lieutenant colonel boasts: /"Before 12 April 1980, I could not go into some boutiques in the city. Today, I am part of the ruling team."/

For the moment, only the ethnic factor plays a catalytic role in the PRC, the majority of whose members are of the Khran tribe, of which the chief of state is a member and which represents 10 percent of the population.

The latest ministerial shuffle has deprived Sergeant Doe of one of his biggest trumps in the secret struggles for influence which divide Tolbert's successors. Mr George Bolley, who comes from Doe's own village, lost his position as minister of state for presidential affairs which had made him a veritable prime minister. George Bolley is the only civilian who has kept informed of preparations for the coup. His appointment to PTT [Posts and Telecommunications] is nothing less than a scarcely veiled cashiering. At the very least it shows Samuel Doe's lack of authority. It was reportedly Vice President Weh Syen who asked for and obtained George Bolley's head.

If it is true that one coup often leads to another, then everything leads us to believe that the classic scenario is in the works: a "strong man" eliminating his co-conspirators and seizing the leadership of the country for himself. It is certain, in any case, that the process of returning to a civilian regime will not get under way as long as the situation at the top is not cleared up.

Political Brawling

On 24 December 1980 Sergeant Major Doe announced the upcoming establishment of a commission that would be responsible for drawing up a new constitution. But in Monrovia no one has any illusions about the army's intentions to relinquish power in 1983. On the contrary, what is expected is a series of settlements of accounts among the ruling team's different components. In a government where the average age [of the ministers] is about 30, the civilians are subjected to constant strife. MOJA and Gabriel Bacchus Matthews' PPP are less concerned about the national interest than about leadership. But, while the PPP presents a united front, MOJA's two leading lights--Nah Tipoteh and Henry Fanbulleh--are rivals. The former is, of course, still the president of the party. But it is the latter who is sailing before the wind, in the eyes of the militants.

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In addition to this brawling of the politicians, there is skirmishing within the army. Roughly speaking, two clans are in competition. There is the liberal faction of General Quiwonkpa, obviously in the American camp. Moreover, he has just finished lengthy eye treatments at an American hospital. An advocate of strong government, he declares himself determined to see that "the decisions of the head of state are carried out." Many people see him as Sergeant Doe's probable successor. Especially since he has the army behind him.

The fact that he may have the support of the United States will do him precious little good: this young officer will have to reckon with his colleagues in the "hardline" faction grouped around Generals Weh Syen and Podier. It is said that these two are flirting with Libya and the Eastern countries. The fact is that they seem to have no understanding with political types (Tipoteh, Matthews) whose importance is not negligible. One need only recall the role played by the party of the current minister of foreign affairs in the unleashing of the uprisings that in April 1979 kicked off the process which was to lead to the fall of the Tolbert regime a year later.

Popular Grumbling

The main actors are in position and an unavoidable confrontation is in the making. "It is like in a western," comments a Western diplomat. "It is a question of who will draw first." Was a revolution needed so that a year later these dangerous quarrels could continue?

The record of the natives' revolution is not easy to assess. "The changes are no longer visible," admits Bacchus Matthews. "But is it not already something to have given back the power to the people?" The statement is certainly exaggerated. Of course, the press remains astonishingly free.

Before the ministry of justice the statue of Themis welcomes the visitor with these words graven on its base: "Let justice be done to all people." But the curfew is still in force, testifying to the insecurity that prevails in the country. At the office of the president, young soldiers come and go, nervous and anxious, machine-guns and revolvers in hand. The reform measures that were announced have not yet begun to be implemented. On the contrary, some practices have almost been institutionalized. The policeman at the airport who picks your taxi has his hand out as you step into the vehicle and shut the door. Not at all in order to greet you, but rather to get a tip. The number of mistresses remains one of the external signs of wealth. But the grumbling among the people continues to become louder as the days go by. Whereas military pay has been substantially increased, going from \$100 to \$250 per month, and the active duty strength of the army is to be increased by 60 percent, the government has decided to suspend hiring in the civil service. And the rate of unemployment is approaching 50 percent of the active population in Monrovia. In this country which is more than 80 percent illiterate, the minister of works requires the few companies in operation to hire incompetent people. Promotions within the police force have completely exhausted its budget to the point that the policemen are not even assured of getting their pay for March. Worse, the government has made all workers purchase national savings bonds representing the equivalent of one to two months' salary, "to aid in the recovery of the economy." The decision was not greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm by the wage-earners who are already strapped to the limit to make ends meet. Moreover, if this deduction were not imposed at the base, the decision would have had no chance at all of being implemented. As in most cases. Several months ago, the government ordered a 25 percent reduction in

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rents. The proprietors ignored it and shrugged it off. The administration did not pursue it... The Liberian "revolution" is visibly ill. But even so! The authorities sent out a circular to all enterprises asking for a financial contribution for the 12 April festivities. All the African countries were invited to send representatives to the 3-day festivities which will mark the first anniversary of the army's seizure of power. But many cautious Liberians have sent their families abroad.

The Grass Has Grown

On Wednesday 11 March, Liberia celebrated /Memorial Day/. In Monrovia cemetery, located at the very heart of the city, a big crowd of people were jammed together as they visited the tomb of a close relative or friend. The grass has grown over the site of the mass grave where the bodies of the former president and his eight companions were thrown. There is no sign to help one recognize the existence of a gravesite.

/"In Liberia, we are very suspicious of anniversaries,"/ is the simple comment of a businessman who has come to lay flowers on the grave of his wife. She died during the uprisings of April 1979. Almost one year later to the day, William Tolbert fell under the bullets of the insurgent soldiers.

All But One Promoted

The night of 11-12 April 1980. It is midnight. Sixteen men are seated on the expanse behind the Executive Mansion in Monrovia. On the eighth floor of that modern building, the apartment of the chief of state, William Tolbert. The 16 soldiers are armed with only two rifles. They are counting on the complicity of the president's chauffeur and a soldier in the presidential guard responsible for watching over the weapons depot in the basement of the Executive Mansion.

Under the command of Chief Sergeant Thomas Quiwonkpa, the soldiers who got arms from their accomplices burst into the president's quarters. Poorly protected, William Tolbert offers no resistance. He offers a briefcase full of dollars in exchange for his life. But Corporal Harrison Penue tears the briefcase from the hands of the president, points his machine-gun at him, and fires. William Tolbert collapses. The soldier pulls out a knife from its sheath and slits the throat of the man who a moment earlier was still the acting president of the OAU. Corporal Penue will recount his exploit several days later before a crowd assembled to witness the public execution of 13 dignitaries of the old regime.

What has become of these 18 men who unleashed the revolution of 12 April 1980? Ten have been named captains; two, majors; one, lieutenant colonel; one, colonel; three generals. All have become members of the Popular Redemption Council (PRC), in which Generals Thomas Weh Wyen and Nicholas Podier are respectively the vice president and the spokesman, while General Thomas Quiwonkpa is commander in chief of the armed forces.

Since the putsch, Lieutenant Colonel Fallah Varney has died from the effects of a traffic accident he had in January 1981. As for the /"hero of the night of 12 April,"/ Colonel Harrison Penue, he has been relieved of his duties as deputy commander in chief of the Liberian armed forces since 15 September 1980. His /"mental instability"/ is regretted.

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Of the group of noncommissioned officers who put an end to more than a century of rule by the /free men,/ only one of them has not received a promotion in the army: the /master sergeant,/ as his countrymen familiarly call him. Quite honestly because he refused to be kicked upstairs as a general. He was, however, the most senior noncommissioned officer in the highest grade. Even today, he prefers his little white Honda Civic to the air-conditioned Renault 30's adopted by his colleagues of the PRC and the members of the ministerial team. But when he drives it, he is still surrounded by five Mercedes transformed into security cars. For after all, Samuel Kanyon Doe--the sergeant in question--is in fact the president of the republic and the president of the PRC.

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LIBERIA

BRIEFS

AIR LIBERIA DEBT PROBLEMS--The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has in effect called upon all member countries to refuse to honor airplane tickets issued by Air Liberia. IATA is demanding the re-payment of close to \$500,000 (about 120 million Fr CFA) from the Liberian state-owned company which for some months has not been meeting its financial obligations. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 April 81 p 29] COPYRIGHT: [Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9516

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

SOVIET BASE AT MAJUNGA--Madagascar will authorize the Soviet navy to establish a new naval base at Majunga, on the west coast of the island. Moscow will thus be able to fully control the Mozambique Canal, which separates Madagascar from the African Continent. The Soviet fleet already has a base of operations at Nakala, in Mozambique, enabling it to watch the sea approaches to South Africa. [Text] [From the "Entre Nous" column] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Apr-1 May 81 p 14] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"]

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS MAPS--The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Public Works has called for bids for making aerial photographs and maps. The first call is for 2,000 copies each of 1:6,000 photographs and 1:1,000 maps of the Sokoto, Bauchi, Yola-Jineta, Minna, Ilorin, Akure, and Owerri areas. The second is for 1:25,000 photographs and 1:10,000 maps for six projects on areas of 9,100-18,300 square kilometers. [Summary] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1134] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

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SENEGAL

PDS LOSES PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Apr 81 p 43

[Article "Resignations and "Destabilization"---passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] With the resignation of Mr Papa Demba Diallo, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) has lost a third representative in the national assembly. Mr Diallo resigned from the party on 23 March and was enrolled as an independent deputy. Following a dispute with the president of his federation, a commission appointed by the party had concluded that his grievance was unfounded. Is that the reason he left? This is what the PDS thinks. Considering that he has not joined up with the PS (the ruling Socialist Party) like the two deputies who resigned before him. The first in 1979; the second, early this year. Defections which have led Mr Fara N'Diaye, deputy secretary general of the PDS, to say: /"This is part of a plan of destabilization and wrecking orchestrated by the PS. The pace picked up in January 1981."/ The fact is that with the loss of Papa Demba Diallo the PDS now numbers only 14 deputies in the national assembly. Now at least 15 are required for the party to be recognized as a parliamentary group. The result: Fara N'Diaye, a deputy and president of the PDS group, is now only a mere deputy. He loses his prerogatives and his position as an ex officio member of the assembly bureau.

The PDS, the only opposition party represented in parliament, is nevertheless still represented at the bureau meetings (by a secretary and a vice president) and at the conference of presidents (the ninth vice-president). This is valid until 13 April, the date on which elections are held for bureau membership. As a quota is reserved to each party, the PDS will doubtless retain the positions it currently holds. Fara N'Diaye, who believes he already has enough responsibilities within the party, will not be a candidate.

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SOMALIA

BRIEFS

FRG, ITALIAN ASSISTANCE--The Somali vice president, Hussein Kulmieh Afrah, visited the FRG during the first half of April on a private basis. He stated that his country is ready to grant the necessary guarantees to private investors. Somalia and the FRG are planning to sign a bilateral investment agreement. Somalia seems to be particularly interested in cooperation in the fields of fishing, oil prospecting, agriculture and industry. Minister of Foreign Affairs Abderrahman Jama Barre visited Rome where he held talks with his Italian counterpart, Emilio Colombo, on the cooperation existing between the two countries. Italy will grant its former colony an amount of 30 billion liras earmarked for the construction of the university in Mogasishu and for the Ogaden refugees. Italy also granted Somalia about 19 billion liras in credits and 7 billion in food aid. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1142] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

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